Glitches

The absolute worst scenario did not happen. The controversial P18-billion automated counting system supplied by Miru did not break down like previous systems supplied by the same company to Iraq and several other African countries did last year.

But for over two hours after the polls closed there was great suspense. The tallies were not being reported with the same speed as in 2022. Instead, we were treated to stories of glitches, double counting of precinct tallies and other such horrors. There were enough snags in the process that the usual suspects mounted protests the day after elections and one losing senatorial candidate demanded a manual recount.

We invested P18 billion for the new technology even if the old one was entirely usable. Only one bidder participated, creating issues involving the Procurement Law. There were some issues about the certification of the software used. For some reason, the Comelec accepted “prototype” technology with an abundance of faith – although possibly with less fidelity to the law governing electoral automation.

Because of the generous investment of taxpayer money, we might rightly expect a faster, more reliable and vastly more transparent counting system. This one disappoints. One struggles to find marked improvements over the previous system.

I imagine all the geeks scrambling on election night, trying to troubleshoot the counting system. They managed to solve several problems after a few suspenseful hours.

Still, the system requires a thorough review.

First, until corrected, the Miru system was found to have double counted some election returns. The cardinal rule in any tabulation system is never to count the same vote twice. The system clearly did not have enough safeguards to prevent double-counting. Miru ran without public oversight what is called a “de-duplication script” to cure the problem.

Second, the machines registered an unduly high number of “overvotes.” This could be due to the lower requirement for shading or to the ink bleed caused by substandard pens. The number of over-votes could have affected a small number of local races.

Third, there were reports that claim the Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails did not match the voter’s selections. Some amount of manual review of this problem will have to be done to determine its extent.

Fourth, a number of watchdog groups raised the alarm that the software version 3.5.0 used in the counting machines is not the same as the one certified by the Technical Evaluation Committee. Miru explains this is just a renamed version of the one certified. This remains an issue nevertheless.

We will have all the time to audit the performance of this system after the counting is all over. The public needs to be assured the P18 billion lavished on the Miru system produced a better, not a more problematic, automated counting system.

Dragged down

In the morning after the elections, the headline stories dwelt on the senatorial candidates who managed to rally from the margins and break into the win column over the last weeks of the campaign. But this is a zero-sum game. Some candidates won because others flagged on the way to the finish line.

The pro-Duterte PDP-Laban’s and the pro-Marcos Alyansa coalition’s ballot box performances are not comparable. The PDP-Laban hastily assembled a senatorial ticket that included mostly token candidates. The Alyansa put together a battle-hardened ticket of veterans, including returning senators. It was a Dream Team sort of line-up designed to overwhelm.

This was a David and Goliath contest. The 2025 national budget was mangled to fund the cash transfer programs and shape the electoral outcome. The pro-administration ticket enjoyed an overwhelming number of incumbents on its side. And yet its campaign delivered a mediocre performance.

Context is important. Midterm elections are always a referendum on the sitting president. With slipping trust and approval ratings, BBM did not have the political capital to rally the faithful and dominate the vote.

The Alyansa campaign, like the administration it supports, was uninspired and uninspiring. Its winning candidates were politicians who might have hobbled their way onto the win column under their own steam, using their own established brands.

At any rate, the Alyansa proved to be the ultimate in the politics of convenience. Its senatorial slate was selected entirely on the basis of winnability – not unity in vision.

Its campaign management was entirely flawed. At the level of local politics, there was no such thing as “Alyansa” candidates. The component parties slugged it out against everybody else – therefore failing to function as a machine to aggregate and deliver the votes for their national candidates. The senatorial slate did not have roots in the network of local political brokers. Local candidates did not have direction and support from a central party formation.

The results of local elections nationwide give little reason for the administration to cheer.

In Cebu, a really dark horse PDP-Laban candidate endorsed by Rodrigo Duterte convincingly overthrew Gwen Garcia’s decades-old dominance over the province’s politics. Most of the overbearing congressmen who starred in the so-called “quad comm” hearings aimed at impeaching Sara Duterte were rejected by voters. A whole army of celebrities and athletes charging into this election campaign like the Light Brigade were similarly wiped out.

The regional disparities on voter choices cannot be ignored. Voters in the Visayas and Mindanao voted so differently than voters in Luzon. Regional polarization in voter opinion may be BBM’s final legacy.